A székely, az indián és a néger: A magyar gyarmati identitások földrajzi képzelete

Dél keresztje alatt

az indián és a néger
tüzet rakni éppúgy térdel
mint a hargitán a pásztor
számolni ujjain számol
különbség ha van az égen
itt a göncöl jön föl este
fölöttük a dél keresztje

a poncsónak nincsen ujja
ritkán telik mégis újra
rojtosul a rojtja rongya
kigyérül akár a condra
különbség ha van az égen
itt a göncöl jön föl este
fölöttük a dél keresztje
egy útmenti fogadóban
talán még boldog is voltam
rióból murryba tartón
a gitárszót most is hallom
más a dallam egy a nóta
itt a göncöl jön föl este
odalenn a dél keresztje

ó te istenáldott földrész
lenn vagy – a szemem rád fölnéz
érett banán az újholdad
íve akár a sarlónak
nézem hosszan vágyakozva
ha feljön a göncöl este
szívemen a dél keresztje

– Kányádi Sándor, 1983

“A Múlik a jövőnk (1989) korszakától Nagy Gáspár kulturális antropológiai jeltárában egy Európán kívülre, illetve a harmadik világra tekintő perspektíva, a magyar viszonyokat ehhez mérő összefüggésrendszer is kibontakozik. Az Ültem egy indián kövön és az Ideiglenes és örökkévaló című versek ennek az új panorámát nyitó szemléleti tágulásnak a bizonyítékai. A kortárs Kányádi Sándor egy teljes ciklust alakított ki latin-amerikai élményeiből, amelyben a 20. századi székely életváltozás és a bennszülött indián sors egyes párhuzamait is középpontba helyezte (Dél keresztje alatt). Szőcs Géza „indián”-versei (Csingacsguk látogatása a világosi villamossági üzletben; Indián szavak a rádióban; érintőlegesen Az elveszett törzs) szintén az erdélyi magyar lét és a rezervátumba vonult indián törzsek sorsanalógiáit erősítik fel. A kelet-európai ember és az „indiánság” fogalmát közelíti egymáshoz a diktatúra idején Szentmihályi Szabó Péter is (Kelet-európai indián). A Nagy Gáspár észak-amerikai látogatását őrző Ültem egy indián kövön című vers a sorsanalógia hasonló horizontját kínálja fel az olvasatban. Az „indián kőről” a létezést bemérő szerző egykori „fizikai” helye az idegennek minősített, hazájában a létperemre szorított ember közérzetének lélektani, társadalmi pozíciója is. A nomád, a kirekesztett, a nem kívánt, az ellenzéki, a kellemetlen ember figuráját összegzi a mű (más, dokumentatív szerepű vonásai mellett) az „indián kő” centruma köré. „A Nagy Medve Tó fölött / azaz a Big Bear Lake fölött / ültem egy indián kövön / – s tán még most is ott ülök – / azon az indián kövön.” A harmadik világ léthelyzeteivel megvont párhuzam – ahogyan Kányádi Sándornál – a Kárpát-medence történelméből és jelenéből, benne a magyar falu életköreiből felszökve vetül rá Nagy Gáspárnál is az egyetemesebb történelmi sorsra. A kultúrheroikus ihletettségű afrikai asszonylátomás az édesanya figurája mögött az Ideiglenes és örökkévaló című versben az anyára vetített sorspárhuzamban nemcsak a fiziológiai hasonlóságokat tárja fel, hanem a kiszolgáltatottságnak – a nemzeti történelem nagyobb távlataiból megítélt – analóg arányait is. „Édesanyám / afrikai törzsek vízhordóleánya / itt a szaharai délben vesszőkosárnyi / étel a fején / esti harmatban fényes csillagok / alatt botladozva / hol meg harangszó légifolyosóján úszva / haza hazafelé / kontya fölött / tonnányi répalevél – – – És átjön a szavannáson /szálig kiirtott réti tölgyek / temetőin / átjön egy fél országon / úton maradtak csontvázát / megnevezi eltemeti / minden bűnt magára vesz / és elátkozza az utakat / el valahányszor/ – innen és túl – / túl életen halálon álmon.””

Jánosi Zoltán: “Kőbe csiszolt villám”. Kortárs, 2012. 9. sz. p. 76-83
http://www.nagygaspar.hu/honl…/index.php/irasok/kritikak/424
Reklámok

Plotting the Semiperipheral Empire: Hungarian Balkanism and Global Colonialism in Geographical Knowledge, 1867–1948

43rd Annual Conference on the Political Economy of the World-System

Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg, Germany

Topic: 2. The Balkans’ inter-imperial linkages

Eastern Europe is the “black sheep” of postcolonial studies: its colonial experiences have been routinely missed out from the relentless focus on (post)colonial centres and peripheries. Since the 1990s, postcolonial literature has extended Orientalism to the Western construction of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and has reinterpreted colonial relations with regards to Soviet imperialism, the postsocialist transition, the European integration, and Eastern Europe’s role in decolonization and socialist globalization. However, due to dominant historical narratives, the imperialist or colonialist ambitions of Eastern or East Central Europe seem to go against the grain, since these countries were often colonized, rarely or never held any colonies, and did not have any significant colonial ambitions.

This contradiction may be resolved by revising the restrictive Western-Atlantic narrative of global history and the territorial understanding of colonialism, and look into the various ways colonialism and imperialism were spatially practiced and geographically imagined in Hungary. Hungarian geographical knowledge production from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries related to the Balkans is a demonstrative case study of semiperipheral imperialism. Hungarian imperialist ambitions grew from the economic boom in the late 19th century and Austro-Hungarian geopolitical interests to secure southern areas against Russia, Turkey and Serbia. Although the tragic defeat in WWI led to the Hapsburg Empire’s demise, huge Hungarian territorial losses and defensive revisionism, these only replenished arguments for Hungarian civilizational superiority in the region.

Hungary’s semiperipheral “in-between” position constructed a complex and ambivalent imperialist-nationalist discourse on various intertwined scales. On the global scale, Hungary was imagined as part of an Empire and the superior white race and civilization. The country was an active observer, participant, and benefiter of “high imperialism”, and Hungarian Balkanism was both deeply intertwined with and a semiperipheral compensation to global colonialism. Standing at both a global civilizational fault line and exchange border, Hungary’s “turn to the East” represented a geopolitical rhetoric of developing Orientalism, approaching the post-Ottoman Balkans, and searching for the Hungarian homeland in Central Asia as an attempt at East-West maneuvering and cultural imperialism in the Asian continent. On the European scale, Hungary countered (mostly) German and Austrian hegemony and Western Europe, but also expanded national hegemony by upholding the merits of European civilization against the half-European periphery and the non-European world, acting as the “lord protector” of Christian Europe against the Muslim East. On the regional scale, the Carpathian Basin became the stage of a Hungarian “civilizing mission” towards culturally backward and “half-Europeanized” landscapes, in order to both bring and protect European civilization by upholding a “bridge” role and an essential “healthy mix” of Eastern and Western traits. The ideal nation-bearing hearthland landscape of the Alföld basin was geographically co-constructed in relation to the Balkan “Other”, while imperialist visions of cultural and economic expansion were naturalized by transforming the “wild” Karst and opening to “the Hungarian sea”. The Balkans offered a gateway to sovereign Hungarian development by de-linking from Western dependency and maturing as a true European nation by linking through active maritime participation to the global colonial world.

See an earlier version of this project here.

Hungarian Indians: Racial and anti-colonial solidarity in post-Trianon Hungary

baktay-indian.jpg

Ervin Baktay posing as Chief Lazy Buffalo

Find below a new abstract I produced for the “Historicizing ‘Whiteness’ in Eastern Europe and Russia” conference call, an event organised by the Centre for the Study of Equal Opportunity Policies at the Political Science Department, University of Bucharest on 25–26 June, 2019.

The end of the First World War propelled the rearrangement of the global colonial-imperial order, including Central and Eastern European relations, positions and strategies within this system. In Hungary, the Axis defeat and the humiliating Treaty of Trianon (1920) delivered a fatal blow to expansive imperialist and ethnic assimilationist visions, and led to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the peripheral destabilisation of previous legitimation to nationalist and ethnocentric superiority based on the global racial-colonial order. Stuck between rivalling and hostile “small Entente” nationalisms, the Hungarian post-Trianon urge to reorganise global alliances and solidarity networks and to reinvent the racial and cultural basis of national coherence resulted in various strategies. These included defensive and traumatised victimisation intertwined with cultural superiority, visions of agrarian revitalisation and “third way” development (folk writers), revanchist search for Eastern alliances against the Atlantic West (Turanism), bitter critique of Wilsonian sovereignty in the League of Nations decolonisation debates, and radical versions of expansive racial imperialisms by geopoliticians aligned to the Italian and German “colony question”.

In this context, Hungarian cultural connections to North American Indians emerged in the 1920s as both a state-subsidised and bottom-up anti-colonial solidarity movement engaging with comparative colonial experiences. The boy scouts’ movement, through the initiative of Pál Strilich, actively popularised Indian culture by building on (and partly criticising) the widely popular genre of the Western and the exoticised pioneer frontier of the Wild West – an uncertain but promising “free world” in which masculinity, survival and combat virtues, and lonely heroes of valour amidst moral turmoil served well in post-Trianon imaginations. Solidarity with the Indian “noble savage” was established through cultural similarities in nomadic culture and mythology (Hungarian Orientalism), romanticist longing for an essential and authentic culture (nativism), return to nature and mysticism, revival of an idealised folk culture and delinked rural utopia (tribe communities), and – most importantly – anti-colonial solidarity resonating with ideas of a lost homeland, traumatised subalternity and revanchist anti-Western critique. Hungarian Indian subjectivity and cultural appropriation entangled with local centre-periphery relations by mobilising rural identities and criticizing decadent and alienated urban life, capitalism, modernity, and Western imperialism. Since the mongolid Indian “redskins” fitted neatly in the “noble Other” Asian “yellow race” within the Eurocentric tripartite racial hierarchy (white, yellow, black), Hungarians positioned the Indians within state-led Turanism, the search for the magyar homeland and cultural imperialism towards the East, thereby legitimating bonds of racial brotherhood. The paper explores these processes through the activities of various “Hungarian Indians,” including the “Indologist Indian” Ervin Baktay, József Wiesler aka Kószáló Éji Sas (Roaming Night Eagle), and Sándor Borvendég Deszkáss aka Fehér Szarvas (White Deer). After Sovietisation, “Hungarian Indians” became a reactionary anti-communist counterculture which fought in the 1956 revolution, and remained a subculture during socialism. This paper interprets the Hungarian Indian trope as a peculiar semiperipheral colonial strategy of racial in-betweenness, and rethinks this legacy in light of the selective racialisation of current political discourse and biopolitics, including solidarity, migration and reproduction.

Keywords: Hungarian Indians, anti-colonial solidarity, semiperipheral coloniality, racial politics

“Third way” development politics and culture war in Hungary after 1945

Check out our panel at the ASEEES Summer Convention in Zagreb in 14-16 June 2019, to be held at the Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesUniversity of Zagreb.

Organizer: Zoltán Ginelli

How did Hungarian politics, in the name of “catching up” to the West, construct visions of development amidst structural change and global (re)integration, and how did these spark “culture war” and affect cultural solidarity and exchange? How did the idea of a “third way” political economic development in Hungary generate alternative and competing visions of cultural solidarity and alignment? How can we conceptualize these intertwined structural and discursive processes in Hungary by considering transnational and centre-periphery relations on various geographical scales? Our panel aims to address these questions by empirically exploring the role and relationship of intellectual experts and the state in Hungary after 1945, how their networks (re)organized along new alliances and conflicts due to wider political economic and discursive shifts.

The panel focuses on three main aspects. First, how state representatives, reformist intellectuals and ideologues tried to construct an alternative “third way” development politics in reaction to global restructuration and as a maneuver between East and West to reposition Hungary and Eastern (Central) Europe. Second, the “third way” is also a contested epistemological field in the analysis of the Hungarian path of semiperipheral development between accepted Western dichotomies (such as neoliberalism and authoritarianism, state and market, socialism and capitalism, East and West). Finally, the panel seeks connections between political economic shifts and cultural rearrangements, how new cultural politics were formed and how new forms of cultural solidarity or distinction evolved regarding space, class and race.

Keywords: Hungary, culture war, post-WWII period, third way development, intellectuals

  

SESSION 1

Chair: Gábor Danyi

Discussant: Stefano Bottoni

Anti-Germanism, and the definition of „New Hungary” 1945-46 – A special brand of „third world nationalism”?

Csaba Tóth

1945 was described at the time as a revolution and later as simply a „turning point” or „year zero” in the case of Soviet occupied Eastern European countries. As in Czechoslovakia or Poland, anti-German sentiments defined the first explanations of what happened and how to go forward in Hungary immediately after the Second World War. Those who then gained power were tasked with a difficult objective: reorganizing not only the state and its apparatus, but offer a new, credible identity to the people of Hungary itself. My presentation argues that they did so, mainly by importing anti-colonial sentiments, and trying to utilize them in a way that would legitimize Soviet occupation and the new regime as one that liberates Hungary from centuries of German domination. (Szekfű 1947; Révai 1948.) This interpretation invoked an early form of third world post-colonial sentiment known at the time from Indian and Chinese anti-colonial powers. Stalin himself oftentimes emphasized the pivotal importance of “national front struggles” against imperialism in China and India (Radchenko 2012) and this view and approach was strikingly similar to the Soviet Politburo’s standpoint on Hungarian and more generally, Eastern European struggles against Fascism and German domination. This approach had an effect on Hungary on the official level: not only in the form of the creation of a first and foremost nationalist “popular front” in 1944, and the definition of independence as “liberation”, but also on the focus on the expulsion of ethnic Germans, the rhetoric against Germans and “pro-Germans” (made similar to “Fascists”) during the first post-war years. Following previous ideas of “ethnic symbolism” (D. Smith 1987.) and ethnic myths as a nation-building historical force and the recognized effect decolonization made on Eastern European Consciousness as well as criticism of the established geographical restrictions on post-colonial studies (Owczarzak 2009; Spivak 1999) my study argues that a special kind of “Third Worldism”, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism is essential to understand the origins of post-1945 Hungarian “democratic” nationalism, prevalent to these days.

 

Geographical narratives as key elements of the culture war in Hungary

Péter Balogh

This contribution will show how a number of historically deeply rooted but competing geographical narratives exist in Hungary, which orient the country towards different geographic and ideational directions. Indeed, the gradual demise of consensus politics, which focused on European/transatlantic integration and market economy, has by the turn of the millennium given way to a culture war of some sort in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Trencsényi 2014). Yet despite being a small and ethnically relatively homogenous country, according to Janke (2013: 56) for instance Hungary appears more divided along ideological and geographical lines than e.g. Poland. Hungary is burdened by the conflict between the folkish and urbanite traditions, for instance, which goes back to at least the interwar period (Trencsényi 2014: 139). The notion of ‘Central Europe’ served pro-European aims and integration with the West in the 1980s and 1990s (Balogh 2017). There is a centuries-old image of the ‘Christian bulwark’ (Száraz 2012) against Muslims etc., recently mobilized during and after the 2015 refugee crisis. There is also a completely competing Turanian tradition since at least the beginning of the past century that emphasizes the Asiatic and Turkic roots of ancient Hungarians, and which was then as is nowadays deployed for hoped commercial and political benefits in Asia (Balogh 2015). It is argued that these narratives are both geographically and ideologically irreconcilable and form essential elements of the Hungarian culture war(s).

 

Post/colonial Hungary: Opening socialist Hungary to the “Third World”

Zoltán Ginelli 

Eastern Europe is the “black sheep” of postcolonial studies, which focuses either on the global centre or the periphery, but silences Hungary’s complex historical relations and experiences to coloniality, colonialism and imperialism. This paper introduces the historical project of “post/colonial Hungary” in order to conceptualize Hungarian post/colonialities in semiperipheral development relations. This new approach criticizes constructivist approaches to postcolonialism in Eastern Europe by “speaking back” from the Hungarian semiperiphery and unearthing the forgotten density of local historical contexts and epistemological trajectories. The paper focuses on the post-1945 global realignment of Hungarian foreign policy, namely how Hungary’s turn towards Afro-Asian decolonization and the “Third World” induced a “cultural war” intertwined with visions for “third way” development under state-socialism, drawing parallels between postcolonial and Hungarian development history. Anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist solidarity contested previous civilizational and racial fault lines, but went hand-in-hand with the socialist civilizing mission in development assistance and pragmatic foreign economic maneuvering between East and West. Hungarian assistance to Non-Aligned Ghana led to founding the Centre for Afro-Asian Research (1963) under the economist József Bognár, who propagated export-oriented growth based on development experiences in postcolonial countries under the New Economic Mechanism. From the 1980s, the pro-West “back to Europe” turn and postsocialist market-liberal transition in Hungary silenced these historical relations with the postcolonial global periphery. Finally, the paper offers new insights into how a new “coloniality discourse” was based on complex historical experiences and appropriating postcolonial critique in the geopolitical maneuvering and “cultural war” of Viktor Orbán’s government after 2010.

 

SESSION 2

Chair: Péter Balogh

Discussant: Stefano Bottoni

The Prosecution of the Central Eastern European Neomarxist Opposition

Richárd Zima

The paper deals with the philosophers’ groups, which represented the Marxist alternative of the state socialist ideology and created the leftist opposition in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Most of these philosophers participated in the 1956 and 1968 movements, and in some cases, influenced them. Their philosophical and sociological research pointed out the real nature of state socialism. On that basis, their common aim was to find the ‘tertium datur’, the third way in opposition to the capitalist and the state-socialist order. The theoretic prosperity of the ‘60s ended with the prosecution of these groups as they fell victim to the cultural war initiated by their governments. This paper aims to provide insights into the intelligentsia’s prosecution caused by their critical description of the state socialism and, as a result of their attempt to seek alternatives, into the similarities and differences between their Neomarxist theories of the ideal society. The dissolution of this theoretical wave was a result of the political response to the aftermath of the Eastern European movements of 1968 as well as the dynamics of Soviet and world politics at the time. The differences among the processes of prosecution in the aforementioned countries will lead us to a deeper understanding of this Neomarxist opposition’s place in the complexity of Marxism itself. This would lead me to briefly introduce the rise of a new form (and generation) of leftist oppositional thought at the late ‘70s, which turned out to be less and less Marxist.

 

Transnational “Solidarity” in Poland and Hungary

Gábor Danyi

From the 1970s onwards, the transnational diffusion of ideas, techniques and strategies has helped to develop simultaneously the dissident movements in the Soviet-bloc countries. At this time the Hungarian democratic opposition from the establishment of the Polish Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) sought contact with the Polish opposition. As a consequence the knowledge of alternative printing and the strategies of legalism, conspiring and non-violence were transmitted to small dissident circles in Hungary and under the influence of „new evolutionism” Hungarian intellectuals created parallel institutions, such as a flying university, legal aid service or alternative publishing houses. The tightening unofficial contacts between dissidents led to the emergence of a transnational dimension of solidarity in the bloc. However, it must be acknowledged that the very limited import of Solidarity movement in Hungary resulted in an asymmetry between these countries regarding the extension and patterns of cultural resistance and opposition. The paper interprets the new dissident practices and parallel institutions emerging in the 1980s in terms of “culture war” as far as they helped to form diametrically opposed ways of political and economic programs, geopolitical imagination and collective memory. Focusing on the history of Hungary and Poland the paper analyzes structural differences of the opposition movements and highlights the patterns of transnational/global solidarity.

 

German and American Political Assistance in Hungary: Western Development Models, Cultural Politics, and the Crises of Democratic Capitalism

Kyle Shybunko

When German political foundations and American “democracy promotion” outfits such as AID and the National Endowment for Democracy arrived in Budapest to help build a liberal democracy, they arrived in a country that was undergoing rapid political and constitutional change after years of party dictatorship. The chief tasks at hand were the democratization of politics, the promotion of an independent civil society, and the establishment of a market economy. Hungary would be returned to Europe. They also arrived in a society with a history of kulturkampf dating to the late 19th century when Hungarian liberals and Catholic nationalists spoke of a war for Hungary’s sovereignty fought on the terrain of culture, ethnicity and confession. Hungary’s new pluralistic politics was implicated by a revived version of this “culture war” which, like both its fin-de-siècle and interwar versions, was fundamentally tied to competing ideas of Europe and Hungary’s European-ness. How did these West German and American organizations navigate this Hungarian landscape which was otherwise understood to be the most promising and fertile in the New Europe with its rich tradition of reform economics? By examining the grant-making practices of these organizations in the 1980s and 1990s I show how funders approximated the political orientation and programs of civic organizations and incipient political parties, and how they understood cultural politics to be epiphenomenal to the urgent work of democratic capitalist transformation, missing in-fact the geopolitical and political-economic valences of these “culture wars” which are only so apparent at the current juncture.

 

The Ghetto as a Mobile Technology: Problematizing Gettósodás/Ghettoization in Budapest’s Eighth District after the Neo-Liberal Turn

Jonathan McCombs

This paper explores the transnational connection between racial regimes in the United States and Hungary to highlight how urban scholars and policy experts have sown racial and cultural divisions through the discursive concept of the ‘the ghetto.’ Inner city areas in the United States in the 1970s saw an increase in the concentration of very low-income, highly segregated black communities. In a bid to make sense of the worsening condition for inner city blacks in the US, scholars began describing these new urban spaces as ‘ghettos’ to account for the strong majority of racialized minorities (over 90%) living in these spaces and the limited life chances that ghetto inhabitants were afforded. Twenty years later, as Hungary underwent its own form of neo-liberalization, the discourse of ghettoization was picked up by scholars and policy makers to describe the conditions of inner-city Budapest districts that had come to be inhabited by a large Roma population and had been badly disinvested during state-socialism. In this presentation I focus on the Eighth District, which has been heavily stigmatized by experts as a ghetto since the early 1990s and has undergone state-led gentrification projects to curb the so-called ghettoization process. I show how the ghetto narrative was articulated in Hungary as a mobile technology of racial government, describing how it inflamed existing racialized divisions, igniting a culture war waged by policy makers and the local Eighth District government against Eighth District residents.

A “race” magyar fordítása: faj vagy rassz?

Az utóbbi időszakban egy Homi Bhabha szöveget fordítottam egy magyar kulturális térelméletekkel foglalkozó tanulmánykötetbe. Ez a szöveg az eredetileg 1994-ben megjelent The Location of Culture című kötetének bevezetője, amely a kötettel és a szerzővel együtt a társadalom- és bölcsésztudományok területén “klasszikusnak” számít. A fordítás során sokféle kihívással szembesültem, de ezek közül az egyik legérdekesebb és legalapvetőbb probléma a “race” fordítása volt. A szövegbe egy hosszú lábjegyzetet is írtam erről. Mivel úgy gondolom, ez egy nagyon is visszatérő probléma, és megfelelő alkalom arra, hogy a hazai viszonylatban nézzük a posztkoloniális kutatási irányzat kibontakozásának fő problémáit, ezért itt is közlöm a lábjegyzetet (némileg tagoltabban). Várom a hasonló problémával küszködő kutatók válaszait, javaslatait!

A szövegben előforduló angol race kifejezés magyarra fordítása magyarázatra szorul. Az angol (illetve francia) race az eltérő (társadalom)történelmi kontextusok miatt pontosan nem feleltethető meg magyar változatainak: rassz és faj.

Szigorúan biológiai értelemben mindkettő a taxonómiai rendszer (hierarchia) adott csoportszintjeit jelöli: az angol species megfelelője a faj, míg a race vagy rassz az alacsonyabb rendű alfajt, fajtát jelenti, amit – sokkal bizonytalanabbul és önkényesebben – inkább a földrajzi eloszlás és a testi jegyek alapján definiálnak. Az emberi rasszokat tudományosan a 19. századi fizikai antropológia kategorizálta és rendszerezte elsősorban ún. morfológiai jegyek, a külső testi megjelenés és részben örökléstani vizsgálatok alapján. Azonban ezek a rasszkategóriák mára tudományosan meghaladottá váltak önkényességük, esszencializálásuk, az esztétikai és vallási eszmék kanonizáló hatása, az implicit eurocentrikus és hatalmi hierarchiát kifejező tartalmaik miatt, illetve a modern génprofilokkal csak nehezen összeegyeztethetőek.

Az angol race a 19. század közepétől a darwinizmus származástani-evolúciós irányzatai mentén kulturális, civilizációs, geopolitikai és földrajzi jelentésekkel felruházottan terjedt el; hasonló jelentésű a magyar faj fogalma, ezzel szemben a rassz mindvégig megtartotta szűkebb biológiai értelmét. Míg a globális gyarmatosításban vezető szerepet játszó imperialista briteknél a race sokkal szorosabban kötődött a fajelméleti hierarchiák ideológiáihoz, addig a magyar diskurzusban a faj vagy népfaj ehhez képest a faji hierarchia jelenléte mellett inkább a nemzet(iség), a néplélek és a nemzeti kultúra és táj fogalmaival párosult, és jobban kapcsolódott regionális léptékű etnikai identitásokhoz, mint az inkább globális léptékű brit jelentés vagy kifejezés.

A nemzetközi szakirodalomban a race állandó társadalomkritikai jelentésmódosulásokon esett át (különösen az afro-ázsiai dekolonizáció és a posztkoloniális kritika hatására), de az eltérő társadalomtörténetű magyar kontextusban ilyen kritikai újraértelmezési fordulat nem igazán következett be, így 1945 óta a faj régiesen hat (anakronisztikus) és a fajelméletek átkát viseli magán. Ezért alakult ki az az ellentmondás, hogy habár a race történelmileg hűbb megfelelője a gazdagabb jelentéstaralmú faj lenne, mégis negatív konnotációi miatt mellőzik és csak szűk biológiai jelentését ismerik el, a race-t pedig egyszerűen rassznak fordítják (mindkettő helyes), holott ez utóbbinak a sokkal szűkebb biológiai jelentése nem adja vissza az angol kifejezés jelentéstartalmait – mindeközben a rassz és faj fogalmainak történelmi és földrajzi egyeztetése megvitatlan maradt.

Ez viszont többféle ellentmondást is teremt: a rasszizmus bevett kifejezés, miközben a fajelmélet vagy fajgyűlölet szintén (ebben az alakban fennmaradt a faj régi jelentése, sőt a rasszelmélethez képest elterjedtebb), holott a tisztán biológiai felfogásban egyetlen emberi faj létezik. A faj és faji származás vagy identitás kifejezések használata tehát nem jelenti a különböző emberi fajok létezését meghatározó fajelméletek elfogadását. Forráskritikailag a race kifejezés fajra fordítása tehát történelmi kontextuális okokból, a rassz pedig tudományos értelemben megalapozott; a szövegben ennek megfelelően mindkettőt használom.

The geography of the Nazi deportation of Jews and other ethnicities in Eastern Europe

Die_'großzügigste_Umsiedlungsaktion'_with_Poland_superimposed,_1939.jpg

Nazi propaganda poster of the Third Reich in 1939 (dark grey) after the conquest of Poland. It depicts pockets of German colonists resettling into Polish areas annexed by Nazi Germany from Soviet controlled territories during the “Heim ins Reich” action. The outline of Poland (here superimposed in red) was missing from the original poster. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost

“The further east the Jewish communities were located the shorter was their path to the place of annihilation. Within the Soviet Union where the Jewish communities were hardly organized effectively within a ghetto, the Jewish population was usually summoned by the SS men and executed near the town where they were concentrated. In Poland where the ghettos and Jewish self-government had existed for several years, the Germans took precautions not to annoy the Jews by the executions in the vicinity of the towns but disposed of them in secret and distant extermination camps. In this way the Germans could secure initially the cooperation of the Jewish Councils which readily supplied the requested quotas “for resettlement and work in the East” from the overpopulated, starved, and disease-ridden ghettos.

The Nazis went to greater pains to preserve the appearance of “enlistment for work” in other countries under their occupation and especially in their satellites. In some cases there were regular contracts offered to the semi-independent governments which provided for the delivery of Jews for the “work in the German East” and these even included a clause for eventual return if the governments concerned wanted them back. The “enlisted” Jews were then transported eastward, sometimes as far as Riga and Minsk, but usually to the closer extermination camps in Poland. Sometimes to show off Germany as a “cultured nation,” the Nazis transported the Western Jews in luxurious pullman trains and supplied them with fancy camping equipment (like tents and field-kitchens) which, of course, were taken away at the place of destination.”

Kamenetsky, Ihor (1961): Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe. New York: Bookman Associates. 168–169.

Plotting the semiperipheral empire: Hungarian imperialist imaginaries of Balkan landscapes, 1867–1948

Eastern Europe is the “black sheep” of postcolonial studies: its colonial experiences have been routinely missed out from the relentless focus on (post)colonial centres and peripheries. To be sure, postcolonial literature extended Orientalism as the Western construction of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and reinterpreted postcolonialism in relation to Soviet imperialism, postsocialism, Eastern Europe’s role in decolonization and socialist globalization. However, the imperialist or colonialist ambitions of Eastern or East Central Europe seem to go against the grain, since concerning countries were themselves often colonized and rarely or never held any colonies. In contrast, Hungarian geographical knowledge production from the mid-19th to the early 20th centuries related to the Balkans is a demonstrative case study of what I call Eastern European semiperipheral imperialism. Hungarian imperialist ambitions emerged from the economic boom in the late 19th century and Austro-Hungarian geopolitical interests to secure southern areas against Russia, Turkey and Serbia. Although the tragic defeat in WWI led to the Hapsburg Empire’s demise, huge Hungarian territorial losses and a defensive revisionism, this only replenished arguments for Hungarian civilizational superiority in the region. Hungary’s “in-between” position constructed a complex and ambivalent imperialist-nationalist discourse operating on various intertwined scales. The Carpathian Basin was envisioned as the scene of a “civilizing mission” by the superior Hungarian culture towards culturally backward and “half-Europeanized” landscapes, in order to both bring and protect European civilization by upholding a “bridge” role and an essential “healthy mix” of Eastern and Western traits. The ideal nation-bearing landscape of the Alföld basin was geographically co-constructed in relation to the Balkan “Other”, while imperialist visions of cultural expansion and economic modernization in the Balkans were naturalized through the concept of landscape: transforming the “wild” Karst and opening to “the Hungarian sea”.

The shifting hegemonic relations between American and German human geography in light of the quantitative revolution, 1900-1970s

This research project looks at two intertwined processes in the history of North American and German geography from the early 20th century to the 1970s. First, the shifting hegemonic relations between “theory-importer” United States and “theory-exporter” German human geography, in which a formerly peripheral US geography triumphed over its German counterpart and became hegemonic after WWII; second, this shift was connected to the post-WWII quantitative revolution in US and Canadian geography during the 1950s and 1970s, in which the discipline became a mathematical and rigorous Cold War spatial science. This project follows a transnational historical perspective in the historical geographies of scientific knowledge to look at how geographical knowledge circulated and interacted between North America and Germany. It does so by analyzing the influence and circulation of German geographical knowledge and location theories, most notably central place theory in urban and regional planning, which became a paradigmatic theory of Cold War geography internationally, and later re-influenced German geography from the late 1960s from the US. The research project is based on archival research and career path interviews with scholars connected to the quantitative revolution.

Térbeli forradalmak: A „kvantitatív forradalom” kelet-európai kontextusban

A MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpontjában tudományos segédmunkatársként elkezdtem írni a “Kortárs térelméletek közép-kelet-európai kontextusban” című, NKFI-115870. számú OTKA kutatás keretében készülő kötetbe szánt harmadik fejezetemet (az első megtekinthető itt, a második pedig itt). Íme a szinopszis:

A „kvantitatív forradalom” a földrajzban, a regionális tudományban és a térgazdaságtanban (és valamelyest a városkutatásban) kanonizált tankönyvi fejezet, illetve gyakori, már-már közhelyszerű, ám igencsak homályos utalások tárgya a térelméleti irányzatokat bemutató és pozicionáló hazai tanulmányokban is. A fogalom az utóbbi évek nemzetközi szakirodalmában is az új térelméleti viták homlokterébe került, például a Big Data elemzési módszerekhez kapcsolódóan. Ennek ellenére a hazai szakirodalomban egyetlen érdemi munka sem jelent meg róla. Jelen fejezet éppen ezért kritikus szemmel tekinti át a „kvantitatív forradalom” eredeti megjelenését, térelméleti jelentőségét, konstruált narratíváit és későbbi interpretációit. A tanulmány érvelése szerint a „forradalom” egy tudományszociológiai és narratív konstrukció, amely elsősorban az amerikai kontextusból fakadt, ahol a hidegháborús tudománypolitika és az amerikai hegemónia terjedésének termékeként született meg. Emellett a „kvantitatív forradalom” kizárólag a földrajz, a regionális tudomány és a térgazdaságtan területén, és nem tágabban a társadalmi tértudományokban fogalmazódott meg a kvantitatív eszközökkel dolgozó, pozitivista térelemzés megjelenésének hívószavaként, amikor egyúttal előtérbe került a „tér” fogalma a „régióval” és a „tájjal” szemben. Kérdés, hogy ezek alapján milyen szempontból beszélhetünk a magyar és kelet-közép-európai kontextusban „kvantitatív forradalomról”, vagy mivel állítható párhuzamba? A nemzetközi szakirodalomban ugyanis a globális centrum (angolszász) narratívája érvényesült, elfedve a „forradalom” tágabb földrajzi feltételeit és kontextusait, így az ún. „fejlődő országok” vagy a szocialista tömb szerepét.

A történeti gyökerek után a tanulmány bemutatja a pozitivista, empirikus és kvantitatív térelemzési módszerek körüli főbb elméleti vitapontokat és episztemológiai kérdéseket a térről, összehasonlítva a „nyugati” és „keleti” megközelítéseket és örökölt tudáshagyományokat. Ennek során reflektál a nyugati szakirodalomban az 1960-as évek végétől a kvantitatív geográfiával szemben megjelenő kritikákra, valamint a nevesebb képviselők közötti vitákra és idővel változó álláspontjaikra is (pl. Hartshorne-Schaefer vita, Harvey/Smith és Berry vita, Morrill és Bunge radikális fordulata). Kiemeli, hogy a hazai posztszocialista térelméleti diskurzusban a „pozitivizmus” jobbára megfogalmazatlan maradt és retorikai eszközként működött. A nemzetközi szakirodalmi viták tétjeinek és a magyar történeti kontextusnak a fényében értékeli és pozicionálja a hazai szakirodalomban a rendszerváltás környékén kibontakozó „empirikus vitát” és az újabban kibontakozó „térvitát”, valamint rámutat annak ellentmondásaira is. Például kritizálja az ún. „abszolút” és „relatív” vagy „relacionális” térfelfogás közötti dichotómia narratíváját. Hasonlóképpen, problematikusnak tartja a „behaviorista forradalomnak” vagy „fordulatnak” a „kvantitatív forradalommal” szembeni bemutatását (pl. Cséfalvay, Faragó, Berki) a kontextusok és a „forradalmak” közötti térelméleti folytonosságok elfedése miatt. A fejezet végül bemutatja a pozitivista episztemológia fő szempontjait, a térstatisztikai adatpolitikák reprezentációs problémáit, a „térfétisnek” és a tér objektivizálásának a veszélyeit, valamint a kvantitatív és kvalitatív térelemzési eszközök közötti – gyakran retorikailag konstruált – ellentéteket és áthidalási kísérleteket. Rámutat, hogy a tér fogalmának előtérbe kerülése – és annak pozitivista értelmezése – sok szempontból más fogalmakkal (hely, táj, lépték) szemben és nem velük párbeszédben, valamint a társadalomelméleti interpretációk hiánya mellett érvényesült a hazai kontextusban.